The Tor exit relay of a circuit knows both the destination server (and possibly the content of the communication if not encrypted) and the address of the previous relay it received the communication from. The first reason is that Tor tends to reuse the same circuits during the same browsing session. For example, it is poor operational security to use the same Whonix-Workstation ™ to check email via Tor, while simultaneously publishing an anonymous document. It is usually inadvisable to use the same Whonix-Workstation ™ to perform more than one task, or when using two (or more) contextual identities that must be kept separate from each other. No other anonymity tool has a solution to all of these issues.Īnonymous Identities Separation of Different Contextual Identities These issues are for the most part unspecific to Whonix ™. This wiki page focuses on anonymity and security threats that Whonix ™ either cannot, or does not, mitigate at present. Before deciding whether Whonix ™ is the right platform to use, it is crucial that each individual understands the limitations of the tools offered and how to make best use of them. Whonix ™ developers have done their utmost to provide solid tools which protect online privacy, but no perfect solution exists to the complex anonymity problem. Hardened by default and also provides extensive Documentation including a System Hardening Checklist. Whonix ™ comes with many security features
10.2 A Live Operating System or Host Live Mode is Configured.10.1 A Live Operating System or Host Live Mode is not Configured.10 Whonix ™ Persistence vs Live vs Amnesic.9.5 Tor cannot Protect Against a Global Adversary.
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